Security

In place

Threat	What stops it
Eavesdropping or tampering on the wire	QUIC is TLS 1.3, always on
Connecting to a fake server	Clients trust the server’s authority and check its name
Anyone who reaches the port	Mutual TLS: only enrolled, unrevoked clients get in
A read-only client running jobs	Starting and stopping jobs needs a client enrolled with --control
Reading files outside the data root	Paths resolve under it; .., hidden files and links out of it are refused; identity and key files are never served
Requests that allocate without bound	Views are limited in size; client messages are length-checked first
Too many requests or connections	8 requests at once per client, --max-clients (32), 30 s idle timeout
Spoofed source addresses	QUIC Retry before any handshake work
Job parameters as an attack path	At most 64 parameters, each one line of at most 256 characters
Not knowing who did what	Every control request, allowed or refused, goes to an audit log (JSON lines)

In the container

The image runs as non-root (uid 10001). The service file adds:

Flag	What it does
--read-only	The image’s files can’t change; only /data, the cache volume and /tmp are writable
--cap-drop=all	No Linux capabilities: the server needs none
--security-opt=no-new-privileges	Nothing inside can gain privileges
--pids-limit=1024	Caps processes and threads
--memory=<n>g (optional)	Caps memory; sorts of long recordings need several GB

In the supply chain

• cargo-deny checks advisories, licences and sources on every pull request, weekly, and before publishing.
• Base images are pinned by digest, and the build uses --locked.
• Releases publish through trusted publishing, with no stored tokens, after a reviewer approves.

Not done yet

• Container image scanning and an SBOM.
• Signed releases.

Report a vulnerability privately, as described in the repository’s security policy.